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1 Introduction
There is widespread evidence that the availability of costly peer sanctioning can have a
large positive impact on cooperation in social dilemma settings (e.g., Ostrom 1990;
Ostrom et al. 1992; Fehr and Ga¨chter 2000; Walker and Halloran 2004; Sefton et al.
2007). These findings suggest that self-governed monitoring and sanctioning may play
an important role in human cooperation and well-functioning of modern societies.
However, the prevailing evidence is mainly based on the comparison of two extreme
cases; all individuals can punish and be punished by other individuals in a group versus
a situation where no one can punish. These criteria are typically not met in the field
where various factors such as physical distance, endowments and status, and the social
network of actors regularly limit punishment opportunities.
Punishment networks, which define who can punish whom, may play a nontrivial role
for inducing more efficient provision of public goods or appropriation from common-
pool resources. In particular, it seems plausible that denser punishment networks, where
a larger fraction of actors can punish each other, deter actors more effectively from non-
cooperative behaviors. This increased deterrence in denser networks may be associated
with the threat of being punished by more agents and/or the possibility of larger
combined punishment capacity. However, it seems equally plausible that denser
punishment networks may deter actors less effectively from non-cooperative behaviors
if actors believe that the threat of being punished diminishes as the number of potential
targets increases and effective coordination of punishment becomes more difficult. In
addition, the increasing number of potential targets and limited individual capacities to
sanction may reduce the severity of assigned sanctions. Taken together, there is very
little direct evidence on how the network structure and punishment capacity impact
public good provision, imposed sanctions and economic efficiency.
In this study, we provide new empirical evidence on the role of punishment
networks for facilitating cooperation. We employ a public goods experiment in
which we manipulate the structure of punishment networks and punishment
capacities. Contribution and punishment decisions are examined across twenty
rounds of repeated play in groups of four players who have fixed identifiers. Four
networks are examined: a complete punishment network, a ‘pairwise’ punishment
network, an ‘untouchable’ punishment network and a no-punishment network. In
the pairwise network, the group of four is divided into two pairs and punishment can
only take place within pairs, although contributions affect the entire group. In the
untouchable network, there are three agents that can punish and be punished by each
other and one agent who cannot punish or be punished.
By reducing the number of players who can punish a player, the two incomplete
networks (pairwise and untouchable) reduce the total capacity of players to impose
and receive punishment. For this reason, an additional treatment is conducted in
each of the incomplete networks such that punishment capacities were as high as in
the complete network. Individual punishment capacities are manipulated in these
two networks in order to investigate if observed behavior is driven by the structure
of the punishment network or punishment capacity.
These punishment networks were selected for the following reasons. First,
arguably, the pairwise networks constitute the most transparent cases to examine
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issues of targeting sanctions, reputation formation, and limited scope of sanctions.
The untouchable networks were selected based on observations from the field where
it is common that some agents are temporarily or permanently isolated from others,
but cannot be excluded from the benefits of public goods or common-pool
resources. Complete and no punishment network conditions are created as
benchmarks and to better link our findings to the existing experimental literature.
The investigation of punishment behavior in incomplete networks connects our
study to numerous examples of common-pool resource management and public
good provision settings where the geographical structure and state borders may limit
stakeholders’ opportunities to sanction each other. At the same time, many of the
international agreements designed to protect natural resources and curb environ-
mental deterioration implement governance structures that often allow for accurate
monitoring of contributions but limited opportunities to punish detached actors.
A primary finding of this study is that the greater the number of people who can
punish and be punished, the greater the contributions to the public good and the
greater the amount of punishment used in the group. Further, high contributions are
sustained only in the complete and untouchable networks. In addition, the capacity
for one individual to punish another plays a less important role on aggregate
contribution levels than the network configuration. In particular, higher punishment
capacities are unable to stem the observed decline in contributions in the pairwise
network, and also play an insignificant role in the untouchable network. Finally,
consistent with previous findings, low and high contributors are punished (Hermann
et al. 2008), a finding that is consistent with targeted revenge.
This study contributes to the literature testing the effectiveness of various
institutional arrangements to overcome the regularly observed sub optimality of
voluntary contributions. Among the large body of proposed institutional solutions to
the problem of free-riding, opportunities to communicate (Isaac and Walker 1988;
Ostrom et al. 1992; Bochet et al. 2006), costly peer punishments (Ostrom et al.
1992, Fehr and Ga¨chter 2000), verbal sanctioning (Masclet et al. 2003), ostracism
(Cinyabuguma et al. 2005), combined punishment and reward schemes (Andreoni
et al. 2003; Gu¨rerk et al. 2006; Sefton et al. 2007; Leibbrandt and Lo´pez-Pe´rez
2014), reputation networks (Milinski and Rockenbach 2006) and leadership
structures (Gu¨th et al. 2007) all potentially serve as proximate mechanisms to
enhance voluntary cooperation.1
1 Since establishing the seminal finding that costly peer sanctioning can have a large positive impact on
cooperation in social dilemmas, numerous additional studies have identified important limitations that
may reduce the effectiveness of punishments and hinder the achievement of Pareto improvements through
decentralized sanctioning institutions. Among the discussed limitations some particularly notable ones are
the threat of counter punishments that may make people less willing to punish free-riders (Denant-
Boemont et al. 2007; Nikiforakis 2008) or lead to destructive feuds (Nikiforakis and Engelmann 2011),
and anti-socially targeted punishments (Hermann et al. 2008) that may prevent the co-existence of
punishments and cooperative strategies (Rand et al. 2010). Likewise, it has been shown that the cost
effectiveness of punishments plays an important role when assessing the impact of punishment strategies
on cooperation and social efficiency (Egas and Riedl 2008; Nikiforakis and Normann 2008). At the same
time, however, it has been shown that various mechanisms allowing participants to effectively coordinate
their punishment behavior may enhance the effectiveness of decentralized institutional arrangements
(Ertan et al. 2009; Boyd et al. 2010). See Chaudhuri (2011) for a recent article reviewing the experimental
literature on sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas.
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In addition, this study connects to an emerging literature examining the role of
social and geographic network structures on public good provision when
punishment opportunities are absent. Theoretical investigations (Bramoulle´ and
Kranton 2007) and experimental evidence (Yamagishi and Cook 1993; Fatas et al.
2010) point to the fact that contribution levels may differ significantly across
networks. Differences in contributions across such networks are explained by
conditionally cooperative responses to the restricted spread of information about
individual contributions (Fatas et al. 2010).2
More closely related to our study are experiments in which punishment
opportunities in public goods settings are manipulated (Carpenter 2007a; Kosfeld
et al. 2009; O’Gorman et al. 2009; Reuben and Riedl 2009; Nikiforakis et al. 2010;
Carpenter et al. 2012; Cox et al. 2013). Reuben and Riedl (2009) study the
effectiveness of punishment in privileged groups where some group members
generate positive returns from public good contributions. Their findings indicate that
punishment is less effective in privileged groups as compared to normal groups.
Kosfeld et al. (2009) investigate institution formation in social dilemmas where a
subset of players can form a sanctioning institution, while their contributions benefit
the outsiders who do not enter the institution. Nikiforakis et al. (2010) vary the
effectiveness of punishments across individuals. Their results suggest that institutions
with asymmetric sanctioning power can be equally successful in fostering cooperation
and efficiency than their symmetric counterparts. Carpenter et al. (2012) manipulate
monitoring opportunities and show how properties from graph theory can organize the
data patterns that arise in their public goods experiments.
This study differs in several aspects from the previous literature. First, previously
unexplored network structures are examined in settings where decision makers receive
complete information about individual contributions, sanctions imposed, and
sanctions received for all group members. This contrasts with other studies that
investigate the joint effect of information dissemination and punishment opportunities
in networks where group members do not receive information on individual behavior
outside their network (Carpenter 2007a; Carpenter et al. 2012). Second, we use a
partner-matching protocol with fixed identifiers. The advantage of fixed identifiers is
that this information condition captures the essence of many real networks where
individuals have stable positions within a fixed group, not simply a network
architecture describing how a random group of individuals occasionally link.3 Finally,
individual punishment endowments and total punishment capacities are controlled for
2 The influence of exogenous and endogenous networks has been explored in other settings such as
coordination games (Keser et al. 1998), stag-hunt games (Charness and Jackson 2007), games of strategic
investments (Rosenkranz and Weitzel 2012) and bargaining games (Charness et al. 2007). For a survey,
see Kosfeld (2004).
3 A possible disadvantage is that reputation building is easier in the partner-matching protocol. However,
since our primary interest lies in comparing punishment networks and not in disentangling the motivation
of individual actors, we believe that the partner-matching protocol is more suited for our purposes. Note,
by design, the pairwise network requires that subjects know the decisions with whom they are paired. For
experimental control, this implies fixed identifiers be used in the other punishment networks. Clearly our
experimental design represents an extreme case in regard to information subjects have on decisions of
other group members. Such a design, however, provides a clear benchmark from which the effects of
reductions in information could be compared in future studies.
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across groups. Thus, in contrast to many studies, we are able to identify the role of the
punishment network and can rule out potential endowment effects.
2 The decision setting
This study includes data from experimental sessions conducted at Indiana University-
Bloomington (US) and the University of East Anglia (UK). In each session, 12–20
subjects were recruited from subject databases that included undergraduates from a
wide range of disciplines. Via the computer, subjects were privately and anonymously
assigned to four-person groups and remained in these groups throughout the 20 rounds
in a session. No subject could identify the others in the room that were assigned to their
group. Since no information passed across groups, each session involved 3–5
independent groups. At the beginning of each session, subjects privately read a set of
instructions, which were then summarized publicly by a member of the research team.4
Subjects then took a post instruction quiz and were not allowed to continue until all
answers were correct. Subjects made all decisions privately.
Stage 1 of each decision round was a linear VCM game. At the beginning of stage 1,
each subject was endowed with ten tokens to be allocated between a private account
and a group account. For each token placed in his or her private account a subject
received 1 token in payment. For each token placed in the group account, each group
member received 0.4 tokens in payment. After all subjects had made their decisions in
stage 1, they were informed of the aggregate allocations to the group account, and the
allocation of each member of their group identified by an anonymous ID letter (A, B,
C, or D), which remained the same during all decision rounds.
In stage 2 of each decision round each subject received an additional endowment
of six tokens. Subjects were informed that they would make a decision of whether to
decrease the earnings of other members in their group by assigning deduction tokens
to them.5 The instructions used neutral language. Each deduction token assigned by
a group member to another group member cost the initiator 1 token and decreased
the earnings of the recipient by three tokens. Any tokens not used to decrease the
earnings of other group members were kept in the subject’s private account.
Following stage 2 decisions, each subject received information about the
contribution and sanction decisions of every other subject in his/her group.6 More
specifically, each subject reviewed a table which displayed the group account
allocation of each subject in their group and the number of deduction tokens each
subject assigned to each other subject in the group identified by ID letters. This table
also displayed current round and cumulative earnings for each subject. At any point
in the experiment subjects could review this same information from the prior round,
giving them a complete history of individual decisions from the prior round before
4 See Sect. C in the Supplementary Material for the instructions. The programs were written using Z-tree
(Fischbacher 2007).
5 This procedure, which parallels that used in Sefton et al (2007), holds constant the resources available
for sanctioning across decision rounds and decision making groups.
6 In the no-punishment treatment, subjects received the same information regarding individual group
account allocations.
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making their current round decisions. Thus, unlike in many earlier decision settings
that have investigated the use of sanctioning mechanisms, it was feasible for
subject-specific reputations to develop across rounds.7 The network treatment
conditions are the primary rationale for this particular parameterization.
No sanctions were allowed in the benchmark treatment, the no-punishment
network. In stage 2, subjects were simply given an additional six tokens, which were
placed in their private accounts. Otherwise, this treatment was conducted in the same
manner as the treatments that allowed for sanctioning opportunities. As noted in the
introduction, there were three treatment conditions that allowed for sanctions: a
complete network, a pairwise network, and an untouchable network. Experimental
conditions varied only in terms of opportunities for sanctioning defined by the network
linkages. In the complete network condition, subjects had the opportunity to reduce the
earnings of all other group members. In the pairwise network condition, subjects A and
B had the opportunity to reduce the earnings of each other, but not C and D. Likewise,
subjects C and D had the opportunity to reduce the earnings of each other, but not A and
B. In the untouchable network condition, subjects A, B, and C had the opportunity to
reduce the earnings of each other, but not subject D. Further, subject D did not have the
opportunity to reduce the earnings of any group member. For control purposes, subject
D automatically had six tokens allocated to their private account.
Figure 1 illustrates our network treatments. In all network treatments information
flow was held the same. Only the punishment opportunities depended on the
network. In the figures, an incoming arrow denotes that a player can be punished by
the player from whom the arrow originates. An outgoing arrow denotes that a player
can punish the receiving group member.
For control purposes, in the initial set of experiments subjects could assign a
maximum of two deduction tokens to another group member, reducing that subjects
earnings by a maximum of six tokens, regardless of the network structure. Subjects
in the pairwise network automatically had 4 tokens allocated to their private
accounts in stage 2 while subjects A, B and C in the untouchable network
automatically had 2 tokens allocated to their private accounts in stage 2. Players
could use the remaining tokens to sanction players in their network. Thus, in the
initial set of experiments, the maximum sanction that a subject could impose on
another subject was held constant across decision rounds, while the maximum
number of punishment tokens a subject could receive varied across networks.
An additional set of experiments was conducted in the pairwise and untouchable
networks, where the maximum number of deductions tokens that a subject could
receive was equal to that of the complete network. In the pairwise-6 treatment each
subject could impose up to six punishment tokens on the subject with whom they
were paired. In the untouchable-6 treatment, the three subjects in the punishment
network could impose up to three punishment tokens on the other two subjects in
their network. Thus, in these treatment conditions, subjects in the networks could
have their earnings reduced from punishments by a maximum of 18 tokens, the
same as in the complete network condition.
7 Nicklisch and Wolff (2011) and Nikiforakis and Engelmann (2011) study retaliative punishment and
allow the development of subject-specific reputations across rounds.
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Table 1 presents summary information related to subject groups in each of the
conditions. In aggregate, data were collected from 84 four-person groups. In the
experiments conducted in the US, the conversion rate of tokens to dollars was 20 to
1. In the U.K., the conversion of tokens to pounds was 30 to 1.8
In all treatment conditions, subjects played a finitely repeated game with a known
final round. Under the assumption that it is common knowledge that subjects
maximize own-earnings, the theoretical prediction is straightforward. The subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium for each treatment condition calls for zero allocations to
the group account and no-sanctions.9 As noted earlier, however, experimental
studies of the linear VCM game typically find that the level of cooperation observed
is not consistent with equilibrium predictions of zero provision of the group good.
Moreover, other studies have shown that subjects often pay to sanction other
participants when the opportunity is available. However, at the same time subjects
react to changes in the price and effectiveness of punishment (Carpenter 2007b),
suggesting that players strategically assess the cost and benefits of various
sanctioning strategies. At the core of our investigation is the question how the
network structure and disposable punishment capacities affect these considerations.
3 Results
As noted in Sect. 2, experimental sessions for the no-punishment, complete,
pairwise, and untouchable network conditions were conducted in two locations, the
University of East Anglia, UK and Indiana University Bloomington, USA. Recent
work suggests that there may be systematic differences in the behavior of subjects in
Fig. 1 Punishment networks. In all treatments information flow was held the same, indicated by the
lines between players. Every player received information about the contribution and punishment
decisions of every other player in her group. Only the punishment opportunities depended on the network.
An incoming arrow denotes that a player can be punished by the player from whom the arrow originates.
An outgoing arrow denotes that a player can punish the receiving group member
8 These differential exchange rates were chosen to create experimental earnings that yielded
approximately the same real valued payoffs across locations. Subject’s experimental earnings averaged
$22 in the US, including a $5 show-up payment, and £15 in the UK, including a £3 show-up payment.
Sessions lasted from one to one and one half hours.
9 In the sanction treatments there are other Nash equilibria, including some that support efficient
allocations. However, equilibrium strategies that support efficient allocations rely on non-credible threats
to sanction free riders.
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different countries (Hermann et. al. 2008). Controlling for treatment condition, we
tested for differences in behavior in the two locations. A detailed analysis is
available in Sect. A of the Supplementary Material. In summary, the various tests
confirm that there are no statistically significant differences in group allocations and
earnings between the two locations. In addition, within each of the three treatments
with sanctioning opportunities, the average level of sanctions used by groups is not
different between locations. The analysis presented below therefore pools the data
from both experimental sites. Results are first presented at the group level, followed
by analyses at the individual level. We begin with a graphical presentation and
summary statistics which focus on pooled data from the initial set of network
conditions and the pairwise-6 and untouchable-6 networks.
3.1 Group level results
The discussion of results from the initial treatment conditions focuses on three key
outcome variables: (1) tokens allocated to the group account by each four-person
group, (2) total tokens used for sanctioning by each four-person group, (3) tokens
earned by each group. Figure 2a displays the trajectory, across decision rounds, of
mean group allocations, Fig. 2b of sanctions, and Fig. 2c of earnings for the
complete networks (mean across 17 groups), the pairwise networks (14 groups) and
the untouchable networks (15 groups). Mean group allocations and earnings for the
no-punishment networks (15 groups) are also presented. To complement the results
displayed in Fig. 2a–c, Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations of per-
round group allocations, group earnings, and sanctions per group, pooled over
decision rounds.
In all treatments, average group account allocations start at around 50 % of the
group endowment of 40 tokens. In the no-punishment networks, allocations
decline over time to levels close to the Nash equilibrium allocation of zero. In the
complete networks, allocation levels increase slightly and are maintained at
around 25 tokens throughout. In the untouchable networks group allocations
remain steady at around 20 tokens across rounds 1–18. However, allocations are
always lower than those in the complete networks. Allocation levels in the
pairwise networks are very similar to those in the no-punishment networks, though
they are slightly higher after round 5.
Table 1 Design information for network conditions
Network condition Number of
groups US
Number of
groups UK
Total number of
independent groups
No-punishment 7 8 15
Complete 9 8 17
Pairwise 6 8 14
Untouchable 8 7 15
Pairwise-6 12 0 12
Untouchable-6 11 0 11
A. Leibbrandt et al.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 2 a–c Allocations, sanctions and earnings: initial punishment networks
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To complement the graphical presentations, we present evidence below from
non-parametric Mann–Whitney tests of differences in behavior across treatments.10
In our experiment, groups make decisions independently of other groups as they
only receive information about themselves. However, a group’s decisions are not
independent over the 20 rounds in the experiment. Thus the average (allocations,
sanctions or earnings) of a group over all 20 rounds serves as an independent
observation for these tests. The tests confirm the pattern of results drawn from
Fig. 2a–c. Relative to the no-punishment networks, group allocations are signifi-
cantly higher in the complete networks (p = 0.0006) and the untouchable networks
(p = 0.019), but not in the pairwise networks (p = 0.827). Further, group
allocations in the complete networks are significantly higher than in the pairwise
networks (p = 0.009) but not in the untouchable networks (p = 0.117). The
difference between allocations in the pairwise and untouchable networks is also not
statistically significant (p = 0.097).
Result 1: The structure of the punishment network significantly affects public
good contributions. Incomplete pairwise punishment networks are less effective in
increasing public goods contributions.
We next turn to punishment behavior. Recall, in the initial punishment network
conditions, subjects were constrained to use no more than two tokens in sanctioning
another individual, implying that the number of sanctions that could be imposed
varied across network conditions. Yet, as can be seen from Fig. 2b and Table 2,
average group sanctions imposed in the complete and untouchable networks are
Table 2 Summary statistics: group level data
Mean allocation
(standard deviation)
Mean sanctions
(standard deviation)
Mean earnings
(standard deviation)
No-punishment 12.52 – 71.512
(15 groups) (9.134) (5.481)
Complete 26.017 2.532 69.481
(17 groups) (11.878) (1.922) (13.714)
Pairwise 14.942 1.153 68.351
(14 groups) (11.406) (1.0098) (8.308)
Untouchable 19.92 2.293 66.779
(15 groups) (9.365) (1.622) (9.979)
Pairwise-6 16.867 1.696 67.337
(12 groups) (7.456) (1.878) (7.612)
Untouchable-6 23.691 1.732 71.287
(11 groups) (11.740) (1.885) (9.490)
10 In addition to the non- parametric tests, t-tests were also conducted. Unless otherwise noted in the text,
the results are robust to both types of tests. In order to further examine differences between punishment
networks, OLS, Tobit and panel random effects models were also estimated for group level data. The
results are qualitatively similar for all the three models and do not significantly differ from the results
obtained by group level parametric and non-parametric tests. This analysis is available in Tables B1
through B5 in the Supplementary Material. We only present the panel estimations for brevity.
A. Leibbrandt et al.
123
similar in most rounds (p = 0.850) and remain steady at around 2.5 tokens per
round. In the pairwise networks average group sanctions are significantly lower than
in the complete network (p = 0.043) and the untouchable network (p = 0.022).
Thus, the two network structures with greater sanctioning opportunities lead to
increased levels of sanctioning in relation to the pairwise networks.
Result 2: The structure of the punishment network significantly affects
sanctioning levels. Sanctioning levels are lower in incomplete pairwise punishment
networks.
While there are significant differences in group allocations across the treatments,
after accounting for the costs of sanctioning, there is some evidence that group
earnings in the sanctioning networks are marginally lower (or no higher) than in the
no-punishment networks. More specifically, earnings in the no-punishment
networks are higher than those in the other three networks in the first few rounds
and in the last round. However, between rounds 5 and 19, there is no systematic
difference in earnings across network conditions. The statistical tests confirm that
there is no significant difference in earnings between the no-punishment networks
and the complete and untouchable networks (p = 0.533 and p = 0.290 respec-
tively). The non-parametric test suggests a significant difference between the no-
punishment networks and the pairwise networks (p = 0.049). This difference,
however, is not robust to a standard t test (p = 0.243) or to a group-level panel
regression where the baseline is the no-punishment treatment (p = 0.219 for the
pairwise treatment dummy).
Result 3: After accounting for the costs of sanctioning, overall earnings across
punishment networks and the no-punishment network are similar.
To examine whether results 1–3 are driven by the structure of the punishment
networks or differences in absolute punishment capacity, we compare behavior from
the pairwise networks to the pairwise-6 networks and the untouchable networks to
the untouchable-6 networks. Figure 3a–c display the trajectory of mean group
allocations (3a), sanctions (3b) and earnings (3c) for the pairwise networks and the
pairwise-6 networks. Table 2 presents mean and standard deviations for both
networks. In summary, no statistically significant difference is observed in group
allocations, group sanctions, and earnings (allocations, p = 0.503; sanction,
p = 0.837; earnings, p = 0.471). In addition, despite the identical group punish-
ment capacity between the pairwise-6 and complete networks, contributions in the
pairwise-6 networks are significantly lower than in the complete networks
(p = 0.069).
Figure 4a–c displays the trajectory of mean group allocations (4a), sanctions (4b)
and earnings (4c) for the untouchable networks and the untouchable-6 networks.
Table 2 presents mean and standard deviations for both networks. Group allocations
start out higher in the untouchable-6 networks but by round 15, there is no
discernible difference in allocations. Interestingly, sanctioning is not higher but
slightly lower in the untouchable-6 networks in all but five rounds. The combination
of higher group allocations and lower sanctions across most decision rounds implies
that earnings are somewhat higher in the untouchable-6 networks. However, there
are no statistically significant differences between the two untouchable conditions
(allocations, p = 0.452; sanctions, p = 0.253; earnings, p = 0.312).
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Result 4: At the group level, the structure of the punishment network is more
important than the absolute punishment capacity in determining group account
allocations, sanctions, and earnings.
(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 3 a–c Allocations, sanctions and earnings: pairwise and pairwise-6 networks
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3.2 Individual level results in incomplete networks
To complement the group level analysis, we turn to an analysis of decisions of
individual group members in the incomplete networks. The nature of individual
behavior in repeated public goods settings is often characterized as conditional
(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 4 a–c Allocations, sanctions and earnings: untouchable and untouchable-6 networks
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cooperation. In incomplete networks, the network structure and players’ positions in
the network are likely to influence how they adjust their behavior to that of the other
group members. To better understand the effect of changing network structures on
the nature of conditional cooperation, the analyses in the following two sections
investigate how the network position in the pairwise and untouchable networks
impacts group allocations.11
3.2.1 Individual decisions in the pairwise networks
It is an open question whether and to what extent individuals’ allocations are
influenced by the decisions of subjects that are linked to the punishment network
and by the decisions of the other subjects outside the punishment network. More
precisely, in the pairwise networks, subject A might be influenced by the allocation
of subject B and vice versa (similarly for subjects C and D). However, in our
experiment, each individual has information on the decisions of all others in his/her
group. Thus, it is also possible that, within a group, subject A might be influenced
by the decisions of subjects C and D even though he/she cannot be sanctioned by
them.
Table 3 presents the results from a regression of individual allocations in a model
incorporating the following explanatory variables: lagged allocation of subject i,
lagged deviation from the subject with whom subject i is paired in the network,
lagged deviation from the mean group allocation of the other pair in the group,
lagged sanctions received by i, and round dummy variables. The table reports robust
standard errors clustered on independent groups. We estimated an OLS regression, a
random effects panel regression and a Tobit regression to account for censoring of
the observations. The results are qualitatively the same in all three models. For the
sake of brevity, we only report the results from the panel regression. The results
indicate that both the lagged deviation in allocation from that of one’s partner and
the lagged deviation from the average allocation of the other pair significantly
influence one’s allocation decisions (p \ 0.001 for both coefficients) and that the
magnitudes are similar (coefficients for pairwise network are -0.273 and -0.256,
respectively, and coefficients for the pairwise-6 network are -0.138 and -0.178,
respectively).
Table 3 highlights an additional insight in regard to the effect of received
sanctions on allocations to the group account. While the variable lagged sanction
received is positive, but insignificant, when pooling both pairwise networks, this
variable is negative and significant in the pairwise networks (p = 0.014) and
positive and significant in the pairwise-6 networks (p = 0.002). This suggests that
in the pairwise network, sanctions have a negative impact on contributions when the
punishment capacity is small (for every unit of sanctioning received contributions
11 An analysis of individual decisions, pooling across all treatments, was also conducted. The findings
were consistent with previous studies. Previous round’s allocation has a significant positive impact on the
current allocation; positive deviations from the average allocation of others in the previous round has a
significant negative impact on current allocations; and negative deviations from the average allocation
others has a positive impact. This analysis is not included for purposes of brevity, but is available in Table
B6 in the Supplementary Material.
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are decreased by 0.418 token); but a positive impact on contributions when the
punishment capacity is large (for every unit of sanctioning received contributions
are increased by 0.295 tokens).
3.2.2 Individual decisions in the untouchable networks
In the untouchable and the untouchable-6 networks, subjects assigned the positions
of A, B or C are allowed to sanction each other. Subjects assigned the position D
(the untouchable) face no threat of receiving sanctions. In the analysis below, we
investigate the determinants of the allocation decisions of subjects in the A, B, and
C positions separately from those in the D position.
Figure 5a and b present the trajectory of mean allocations and earnings by
subjects assigned to the A, B, C and D positions across decision rounds. As shown,
there is a pronounced decrease in the group account allocations for the subjects in
the D position, relative to those in the A, B, and C positions. The mean allocation
per round by subjects in the A, B and C positions is 5.89 tokens while the mean per
round allocation of subjects in the D position is 3.85 tokens (n = 26 groups,
p = 0.017). Since subjects in the untouchable position also do not spend resources
Table 3 Individual allocations in the pairwise and the pairwise-6 networks
Dependent variable: individual allocations
Pairwise
network
Pairwise-6
network
Combined
pairwise networks
Lagged allocation of i 0.944*** 0.916*** 0.939***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.015)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Lagged deviation from paired subject
in network
-0.273*** -0.138*** -0.198***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.026)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Lagged deviation from mean allocation
of other pair in group
-0.256*** -0.178*** -0.222***
(0.056) (0.049) (0.040)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Lagged sanctions received -0.418** 0.295*** 0.089
(0.170) (0.093) (0.094)
[0.014] [0.002] [0.343]
Constant 0.629*** 0.484 0.436**
(0.216) (0.426) (0.220)
[0.004] [0.256] [0.048]
Observations 1,064 912 1,976
Clusters/groups 14 12 26
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered on independent groups. Figures in brackets
are p values for the two-sided tests of significance
*** Sig. at 1 %, ** sig. at 5 %, * sig. at 10 %
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on sanctioning, they earn significantly more than the other group members as seen
from the second panel of Fig. 5. The mean per round earnings of subjects in the A,
B and C positions is 15.98 tokens while the mean per round earnings of subjects in
the D position is 20.75 tokens (n = 26 groups, p \ 0.000). Interestingly, the
presence of an untouchable does not appear to have a significant detrimental effect
on the willingness to contribute by the other subjects in the same group. There is no
significant difference between the mean group account allocation by subjects in
the A, B and C positions (5.89 tokens) in comparison to the mean allocation of
subjects in the complete networks of 6.50 tokens (ncomplete = 17, nuntouchables = 26,
p = 0.358).
To examine more closely the factors that influence individual allocations of
subjects in the A, B and C positions, Table 4 reports the results from a random
effects panel data regression of individual allocations on: the one-period lagged
allocation of individual i, the one-period lagged deviation of i’s allocation from the
allocation of D, the one-period lagged deviation of i’s allocation from the average
allocation of the other members of his punishment network, a one-period lagged
variable of sanctions received, and round dummies. The table reports robust
standard errors clustered on independent groups.
In summary, allocations of subjects attached to the punishment networks are
significantly influenced by their lagged allocations (p \ 0.001) and the deviation of
their lagged allocations from the average allocations of others in the punishment
network (p \ 0.001). In addition, their allocations are also negatively influenced by
the deviation of their lagged allocations from the allocation of the untouchable
(p \ 0.001) suggesting that the untouchable can trigger higher contributions of the
subjects in the punishment network.12 Similar to the pairwise networks, punishment
capacity appears to determine whether receiving sanctions has a negative (if
capacity is small) or positive (if capacity is large) impact on contributions.13
Finally, Table 5 presents random effects estimates for the determinants of the
allocations of subjects assigned to the untouchable position, D, on the one-period
lagged allocation of individual i, the one-period lagged deviation of i’s allocation
from the average allocation of others in the same group, and round dummies. As
shown, the allocations of the subjects in the untouchable position are mostly
influenced by lagged allocations. The variable, lagged deviation from mean
allocations of other subjects in the group, is negative for both untouchable networks
and highly significant when pooling data from the untouchable and untouchable-6
networks (p = 0.009).
12 As a test of robustness, the regressions in Table 4 were conducted separately for cases where
deviations from D were non-negative versus negative. The results reported in Table 4 are robust to this
analysis; although statistically more significant for non-negative deviations. This analysis is available in
the Supplementary Material (Tables B7 and B8).
13 The above analysis highlights the asymmetry in the reactions to sanctions received related to
punishment capacities in both incomplete networks. In particular, there is some evidence that sanctions
increase future contributions to the public good only when punishment capacities are high. However, the
regression estimates indicate that this effect is small; in the untouchable-6 network, the effect is not
significant at the 10 % level. This small reaction, combined with the low sanctioning levels observed,
leads to the finding that punishment capacities do not significantly affect contributions or efficiency at the
aggregate level (Result 3).
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Result 5: Subjects condition their contribution on the behavior of subjects in and
outside their punishment network.
3.2.3 Patterns of sanctioning behavior
Pooling across treatments and observations within specified intervals, Fig. 6 shows
the relationship between average sanctions received by individuals and the deviation
of their group allocation from the average allocations of others in the group.14 Also
reported are the number of instances in which sanctions were imposed within each
interval. Mean sanctions received are larger when a subject’s allocation is below the
average allocation of others. Importantly however, there is evidence of ‘anti-social’
punishment: some subjects are sanctioned even when their allocations are above the
mean of others.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 5 a, b Allocations and earnings by network position: combined untouchable networks
14 Computing the average sanction for each category includes both sanctions imposed and instances in
which a sanction was not imposed.
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As discussed above, this study employed a matching protocol with fixed
identifiers for each decision maker in a group. An advantage of this protocol is that
it captures a critical informational component of some networks. More precisely,
unlike previous studies examining sanctioning, this protocol allows for sanctioning
imposed on subject i by subject j to be based directly on lagged sanctions imposed
by i on j. Thus, linkages between sanctions imposed and lagged sanctions received
between pairs of subjects within networks (referred to as ‘sanctioning pairs’) can be
examined.
Table 6 presents regressions of individual sanctions imposed on subject i by
subject j as a function of deviations in contributions by i from others in the group,
one period lagged sanctions imposed by i on subject j, treatment dummies for the
pairwise and untouchable networks15 and round dummies. Separate regressions are
estimated for negative and non-negative deviations. The table reports robust
standard errors clustered on independent groups. The results in Table 6 show the
usual pattern for sanctioning when deviations are below the average of the others in
Table 4 Individual allocations (A, B, C): untouchable and untouchable-6 networks
Dependent variable: individual allocations—persons A, B, C
Untouchable
network
Untouchable-6
network
Combined
untouchable networks
Lagged allocation of i 0.930*** 0.948*** 0.946***
(0.031) (0.036) (0.021)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Lagged deviation from allocation of Person D -0.088*** -0.102** -0.101***
(0.021) (0.049) (0.022)
[0.000] [0.037] [0.000]
Lagged deviation from mean allocation
of others in punishment network
-0.408*** -0.395*** -0.402***
(0.035) (0.105) (0.042)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Lagged sanctions received -0.215* 0.113 -0.073
(0.117) (0.103) (0.089)
[0.066] [0.271] [0.415]
Constant 0.298 1.410*** 0.712*
(0.579) (0.417) (0.371)
[0.607] [0.001] [0.055]
Observations 855 627 1,482
Clusters/groups 15 11 26
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered on independent groups. Figures in brackets
are p values for the two-sided tests of significance
*** Sig. at 1 %, ** sig. at 5 %, * sig. at 10 %
15 The pairwise dummy captures both the pairwise and the pairwise-6 treatments, similarly for the
untouchable treatment dummy.
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the group.16 Players are punished for low contributions and they receive higher
sanctions the lower their contributions are below the average; players receive an
additional 0.9 tokens in sanctions for every token they are below the average.
Table 5 Individual allocations (D): Untouchable and Untouchable-6 networks
Dependent variable: individual allocations person D
Untouchable
network
Untouchable-6
network
Combined
untouchable networks
Lagged allocation of i 0.813*** 0.869*** 0.831***
(0.108) (0.072) (0.066)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Lagged deviation from mean
allocation of A, B, C in group
-0.133 -0.212* -0.178***
(0.086) (0.121) (0.068)
[0.119] [0.079] [0.009]
Constant 2.664*** -1.054 1.088
(0.938) (1.379) (0.818)
[0.004] [0.445] [0.183]
Observations 285 209 494
Clusters/groups 15 11 26
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered on independent groups. Figures in brackets
are p values for the two-sided tests of significance
*** Sig. at 1 %, ** sig. at 5 %, * sig. at 10 %
Fig. 6 Mean sanctions received by individuals
16 The results are robust to OLS and Tobit specifications.
Incomplete punishment networks in public goods games
123
We do not find significant evidence showing that (weakly) positive deviations
from the group average lead to ‘anti-social’ punishment.17 However, there is strong
evidence of targeted revenge. Players receive sanctions from those they sanctioned
in the previous round. Such targeted revenge occurs independently of whether a
subject’s contribution is greater (positive deviation) or smaller (negative deviation)
than the average of other group members.
Result 6: Targeted revenge drives anti-social punishment in our networks.
4 Conclusions
This study contributes to the literature on sanctioning behavior in social dilemma
settings by examining the influence of alternative linkages between subjects that
Table 6 Evidence on targeted revenge in sanctioning pairs
Dependent variable: individual sanctions imposed by j on i
Negative
deviations
Positive
deviations
Absolute value of negative allocation deviations by i from
average of others in group
0.093*** –
(0.010)
[0.000]
Absolute value of positive allocation deviations by i from
average of others in group
– -0.0009
(0.005)
[0.843]
Lagged pairwise sanctions imposed by i on j 0.182*** 0.155***
(0.045) (0.034)
[0.000] [0.000]
Pairwise 0.133 0.097*
(0.104) (0.057)
[0.202] [0.088]
Untouchable 0.045 0.060
(0.067) (0.048)
[0.502] [0.208]
Constant 0.333*** 0.375***
(0.103) (0.064)
[0.001] [0.000]
Observations 3,145 6,165
Clusters [sanctioning pairs] 68 [424] 69 [479]
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered on independent groups. Figures in brackets
are p values for the two-sided tests of significance. Includes round dummies
*** Sig. at 1 %, ** sig at 5 %, * sig at 10 %
17 The results are unchanged if a dummy for positive/negative deviations is included instead of the
magnitude of such deviations.
A. Leibbrandt et al.
123
restrict the directional flow of endogenously imposed sanctions, as well as the
capacity to sanction at the individual and group level. We find clear evidence that
the structure of punishment network affects public good contributions and that the
network configuration is more important than the absolute punishment capacity for
public good provision, imposed sanctions and economic efficiency. In addition, our
experimental design renders it possible to identify targeted revenge as a main driver
of anti-social punishment.
The results of this study may have implications for public policy and
organizational thinking related to the pervasive conflict of individual interest and
collective efficiency. In a world where natural obstacles and manmade institutions
limit stakeholder’s opportunities to sanction other actors, a proper understanding of
underlying group structures and how individual actors connect to each other is
crucially important when trying to understand the nature of voluntary cooperation.
This study suggests that the nature of incomplete sanction networks may be more
important than the group’s overall capacity to sanction. This result raises the
question of whether and how collective action groups in the field can develop
institutions or social norms to overcome such incompleteness.
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